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Abstract 
The present paper aims in a first stage, to exploit succinctly the cardinal argument – 
the contract argument - acquainted in “A Theory of Justice”, which provides 
incentives for the two principles’ general adoption. In a second stage, a discussion 
appraising the feasibility of these two principles and their subsequent empirical 
adoption will be dealt with. This contributes to the provision of counter-arguments 
and the highlighting of weaknesses.  
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Introduction 
In “A Theory of Justice”, Rawls offers a theoretical justification of social 
democratic principles of a justitia omnibus, a justice universally valid and 
implementable. This justice is ensured through developing the principle of equal 
liberty and the principle of difference and equality of opportunity. With the aim to 
persuade free and rational persons to adopt these two principles, Rawls invokes the 
contract argument. This latter is mainly supported by the original position and the 
subsequent veil of ignorance. According to Rawls, the original position is not 
supposed to be a realistic situation. Ipso facto, the veil of ignorance is a hypothetical 
normative representation of the types of reasons and information that are relevant to 
a decision on principles of justice. But since fiction has no absolute worth, then its 
axiological value is confined to the convictions it shapes and to a certain normative 
frame, so how can the principles of justice be adopted in practice? Herein, after an 
overview of the Rawlsian contract argument, we will focus on one difficulty related 
to the invoked argument, though without making an exhaustive analyse because of 
the limited words. 
Rawls’ contractual argument for the adoption of the two principles  
The contract argument has its origin in an intuitive idea. The traditional version of 
the state of nature is inherently unjust because certain individuals have more 
negotiation capacities than others, e.g.: more aptitudes, greater amount of resources 
or more physical force. This innate difference of capacities arranges that weaker 
individuals will have to do concessions to favour the stronger ones. The incertitudes 
of nature are affecting every individual, but some are better equipped for facing 
them, and they would not consent to adhere to the social contract from the moment 
on this latter does not ratify their advantages. Rawls considers this classical version 
of contract as departing from an unjust situation. Dixit Rawls his two principles are 
not dependent on a contingent manner on existent desires or social conditions. 
Hence, through supposing that some desires are generally valid and while taking as 
basis the accord concluded in a fair initial situation, it follows that the principles of 
justice are independent from circumstances.  
The contract argument is supported by two instruments: the original position 
(locus contractus) and the veil of ignorance. For Rawls, the hypothetical contract 
highlights the right way to think about and identify what principles justice requires. 
The original position is a heuristic procedure of justification in which, dixit Rawls, 
each individual can put himself at any moment, while the veil of ignorance is a 
dispositive assuring impartiality.  
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The locus contractus is a system, of premises of reasoning, favourable to the 
adoption of the two principles. It corresponds to an initial position of equality which 
guarantees equity of deliberation on the principles of justice. In this position, the 
individuals are endowed with an instrumental rationality: they have preferences 
which are coherent and ordered according to a conception of the good. They are also 
mutually disinterested, trough their amour de soi, which in the Rousseauist 
terminology corresponds to a passion anterior to the social ones. In addition the 
consequence of their rationality is that they accede to reasonability. Individuals are 
reasonable, in the sense that they are endowed with a sense of justice, a capacity 
ensuring that they will respect the terms of the social cooperation. So, the original 
position specifies the required conception of the individual for the contract 
procedure. With this aim, the locus contractus prescribes the implementation of the 
veil of ignorance. This latter filters particular information related to the individual’s 
identity, their inscription in the socio-economic arena, their own conception of the 
good and the level of civilization of the society, in order to neutralize contingencies, 
to neutralize the effects of natural lottery. Rawls’s two principles ensure equity of the 
original position and equity of distribution (Bernardi, 1999): there is no positional 
advantage and no unequal bargaining power. Personal endowments cannot 
constitute a factor in the participant’s bargaining position.  
Hence the mechanism which leads the parties to adopt the two principles is as 
following. In the original position parties seek to promote their own interest, but as 
they ignore their concrete situation and identity – because of the collective public 
perspective (Rawls, 1996) of the locus contractus - they adopt an impartial and 
universal standpoint. Each particular situation has an equal importance and the 
pursuit of self-interest is the pursuit of a general interest. So, first the parties do not 
know in advance their concrete life projects - they are not endowed with a thick 
conception of the good - but have a thin conception of the good, hence they choose 
the first principle for ensuring that they will be able, à posteriori, to realize their own 
conception. Second, parties have no knowledge of probabilities (which position they 
will occupy), in addition they have an innate sense of justice hence they will consider 
some concrete situations as unacceptable. So, they will choose the second principle in 
order to protect themselves from the less advantaged positions. The original position 
enables unanimity to be effective.  
However, because the contract argument is hypothetical, the two principles are 
contained within an autarkic normative and non-prescriptive fiction. Its telos is not 
practical in character. Now, justice is a practical concept which requires that 
contemporary societal – especially the reality of actors – are taken into account.  
 
A. Dobra  Rawls’ two principles of justice 
 
5 
 
One main difficulty related to the in vivo implementation and 
adoption of Rawls’ two principles  
On a theoretical and rhetoric ground, the theory of justice and the two principles 
are perfectly conceivable to be adopted. However, in practice, the two principles face 
several difficulties (one of these will be treated bellow), since the parties deliberate 
rationally within a normative specification. “A hypothetical contract is no contract at all” 
(Dworkin, 1987) and can have no binding force, so there is no commitment for the 
parties to adopt the two principles. The difficulty is related to the premise that each 
rational individual is projecting himself in the reality. Henceforth, the feasibility of 
the theory of justice must be measured. If it is not a modus vivendi, the rational and 
self-interested parties will not adhere to the two principles. 
Let us consider more closely the exigency that parties must deliberate in 
“circumstances, characterized by psychological and cognitive constrains, suitable to the 
exercise of rationality”, (Rawls, 1972). Summarily, the parties have no particular 
knowledge and hence no psychological character (Sandel, 1984), they are only aware 
of general facts, like F= m !"#$ However, the epistemology requires that this symbolist 
consecution has a sense because it is a precise interpretation; each symbol refers to a 
domain of the reality. So, the understanding of this general fact by an individual is 
possible only if this latter has previously had an intuition of the elements of reality he 
refers to. An individual, who has no psychological character, cannot technically 
apprehend the sense of such a general fact. In other words, Rawls substitutes to the 
lambda individual a transcendental individual. This substitution emerges from the 
argumentative imperative derived from his assumption that the two principles will 
be adopted. Indeed, in the case of the absence of the veil of ignorance, partners are 
not enough purified and would fall into the opinion lane (individuals would not be 
able to choose the best principles).  
The consequence of the lack of knowledge, highlighted by Hayek (1945) can also 
be used in order to reinforce the above argument. “Every individual has some advantage 
over all others because he possesses unique information of which beneficial use might be made, 
%&'" ()"*+,-+" &./" -#0" %/"1#2/" (034" ,)" '+/" 2/-,.,(0." 2/5/02,06" (0" ,'" #7/" 3/)'" '(" +,18$"Any 
attempt to impose order upon a society would fail because of the fact that the 
planners involved would not have the knowledge to sufficiently design a social 
order. Instead, it is the individual who knows what is in his best interests and how to 
pursue them. To declare any distribution just is erroneous due to the fact that it 
presupposes knowledge of what is the optimal distribution. The decentralized nature 
of knowledge in society and the resulting impossibility of planning a social order 
annihilate any distributive theory of justice. The optimal distribution can only be the 
result of free and rational individuals who have each, complementary, global and 
particular knowledge necessary to make the best decisions possible. This is well 
crystallized in MacIntyres’s quotation: “Two incompatible demands of the social contract: 
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he wishes it to be the foundation of all shared and common standards; but he also wishes it to 
be a contract, to be so .+#7/2"#02"-(11(0".'#02#72."1&.'"#37/#24"/9,.'$8 (MacIntyre, 1968)  
Although Rawls began by posing a problem of collective choice, ultimately the 
problem is reduced to the reasoning of a single person. If we exclude “knowledge of 
'+(./" -(0',06/0-,/."*+,-+" ./'"1/0" #5#7':$8" then since “everyone is equally rational and 
similarly situated, each is convinced by the same argument”, (Rawls, 1972). This 
construction by lacking the representation of a plurality of parties differently 
equipped, which pursue specific goals contributes to cancel the contract argument. 
The contract argument is raising a dilemma (Sandel, 1996) which highlights its 
circular character. With the veil of ignorance, there is an absence of plurality 
(individuals are indiscernible) so there is no common deliberation. Without the veil 
of ignorance, the plurality is safeguarded but the deliberation is subjected to 
prejudices – because interests enter in conflict due to the rivalrous mimetic founding 
mode - contradictory to the conditions of a free contract. In both cases there is no 
contract, in the second especially, it follows that there is no binding force and no 
adherence to the two principles.  
So, the original position is a logically impossible circumstance and the supposition 
that deliberation can occur among pre-social individuals is incoherent. The general 
knowledge is too vague, so the context and the process by which outcomes are 
determined are forsaken. The laws of such abstract generality are destitute of 
predictive or explanatory potency and any choice is difficult to make.  
Conclusion 
Although Rawls’ contract argument is powerful, in the sense that it constitutes a 
strong mainly rhetoric plea, the idea that the two principles could be chosen in 
practice by rational and self-interested individuals fails. The contract argument is 
mainly supported by the original position and the subsequent veil of ignorance. But, 
if individuals are defined as rational and self-interested then it implies that they have 
self-knowledge. This latter enables them - with our without the veil of ignorance - to 
make interpersonal comparisons and calculate the probabilities they will have to 
occupy different positions within the institutional and social arena. Therefore, Rawls’ 
conception of the individual does not correspond to the reality of how individuals 
are formed by their goals (Sandel, 1984). The veil of ignorance is not plausible and 
the two principles would, in practice, not be accepted.  
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